The SC was asked to consider a relatively narrow question of what the limits on equitable remindies in the discrict courts are. In a significant majority of cases they've exceeded their clear authority on anything like a plausible reading of what non-constitutional courts are supposed to do.
Ironically, imv, I think in this case, they didnt. This was, imv, a case where a universal injunctions was actually within the power of the disctict court -- because (and here Sotomayor is correct) the states were being obligated to take on burdens that "crossed state lines" and a complete remedy to relieve them of these burdens actually requires a universal injunction. So, imv, under the history of what equitable remedies are supposed to do, this would be one rare case where the action of the courts could be legally defensible.
However, the SC was extremely fed up with district courts sending inumerable number of cases their way -- trigger happy judges at the distict level deciding they're going to rule for the whole US in a federal system. So, by this point, they've tried many times to stop it, and it hadnt worked.
Here all they said is that you can have UIs only where congress makes explicit that courts have this power. They have done something kinda similar in the APA (creating judicial review of exec action), and can do again here (eg., a democratic congress could give the power in immigration cases; I think its plausible something like this happens). They also themselves retain the right to make such orders.
So they have only really moved where in the system such action is taken, retaining district court's rights to still -- very broadly -- give quite wide injunctions. And congress still has the power to empower the courts (though, as per usual, Thomas indicates he's on crazy pills and implies he would prevent congress from doing that -- that's not a serious outcome though).
Given the problems they faced with district courts, something had to give. They were persuaded, plausibly correctly, that there are enough avenues to prevent this executive overreach without empowering the lowest rung of judges to rule for the whole of the US.
> because (and here Sotomayor is correct) the states were being obligated to take on burdens that "crossed state lines" and a complete remedy to relieve them of these burdens actually requires a universal injunction
> However, the SC was extremely fed up with district courts sending inumerable number of cases their way
Well hold on then.
So you think the Court was wrong in this case? That they were just on tilt? Because if this case is a case for a universal injunction then does the executive have standing to ask about that issue here?
But if Sotomayor is correct on the relevance of a universal injunction here, then why is your "non-hysterical reaction" defending the decision instead?
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I also find it hard to agree with "judges are creating problems" vs "an increasingly aggresive executive is creating problems." The legislature hasn't been able to do much for a long time because the splits are so close, so presidents try to do more directly. Is enabling that despite how closely split the legislature is ANYTHING like in line with how the US government system is supposed to work?
Cause really, awww, they have more cases than they used to? Welcome to the computer driven future, it sucks for all of us, don't make us suffer because you're tired of it.
Imagine you're a SC judge in this case, and you have to craft a judgement which allows universal injunctions in incredibly narrow and highly specific cases, whilst ruling out almost all of them. And that the area of law you're dealing with is a puddle of mud (equity).
You can either try to do this and roll the dice again on letting district courts interpret this judgement, or just say, basically no -- if you want to do this you have to come to us (or go via one of the other mechanisms). Given there are ~25 recent cases of this in total, its not a very significant number -- but the effects are extremely significant.
They chose the lesser of two evils, and in this lesser world, basically everything is still fine. You can still get the right outcomes.
This is the actual job of the court. There is no right answer. There is only what judgement they can write and what effects it will have, and whether those are the most consistent with the spirit of the constutional order (or statutory order) that has been setup.
its very common for them to rule, "in cases of doubt, just get congress to pass a law allowing this to happen"
They very often actually do amend laws due to SC rulings. Many laws are passed every year, and its very common to see amendements explicitly reply to tell the SC to undo its actions in cases where they've asked congress to be clear.
Just because I think there's a read of "complete equitable remedy" in this case which plausibly allows a district court to issue a UI, does not mean that the SC wasn't right to set a standard which precludes it. Or that asking congress to make this possible isn't the right position for the court to take.
You have to remember that congress is the democratic legislative body, not the courts. Having district courts intrude on US-wide implementation of congress' laws (via the executive) should really require congress to authorise that.
And in any case, they have in the APA -- and the SC can still do it.
> Imagine you're a SC judge in this case, and you have to craft a judgement which allows universal injunctions in incredibly narrow and highly specific cases, whilst ruling out almost all of them. And that the area of law you're dealing with is a puddle of mud (equity).
You can of course, also not take up the issue on this case. I can't find the article offhand, but I believe Steve Vladeck made this point that the SC has passed over a number of egregiously bad universal injunctions, handling them entirely on the shadow docket, and decided to grant full cert and a hearing on this case.
You can maybe argue that that's good in the sense that they're making a strong stand that even in the best example this is disallowed, which is clearer precedent. But also they could have picked a "better" case in the sense of it being a clearer misuse, and used that as the vehicle for the same ruling. Using a Kacsmaryk injunction for the same ruling sends a very different message than this case.
I think there's a clear 7-2 against this EO when its content will be considered. I do not think a lot of them enjoyed making this their stand against UIs; and you can hear in orals robert's frustration with the situation and various desires across the panel to find some way to thread the needle. I dont think any of the 7 trusted the goverment as far as they could throw them. This isn't a pro-trump court, nor one that believes any of this executive behaviour is credible. I think they were not at all pleased with how the case had been brought to them.
It's clear K's concurrence was written as a playbook for how to get to "the right outcome" in this case, and it will be followed. I suspect if that playbook wasnt available, they would have had a much harder time with getting to a judgement.
I actually wouldn't be surprised if the case is stronger than 7-2 on the merits, which makes this an even weirder vehicle: why would the conservative justices pick this case as a vehicle for this decision when there are, as you say, much clearer abuses of national injunctions?
> I dont think any of the 7 trusted the goverment as far as they could throw them. This isn't a pro-trump court, nor one that believes any of this executive behaviour is credible.
I think that's untrue on is face. Either that or the remaining conservative members have a commitment to allowed an untrustworthy executive to commit blatantly illegal acts on a temporary basis as long as they will be eventually addressed.
> Ironically, imv, I think in this case, they didnt. This was, imv, a case where a universal injunctions was actually within the power of the disctict court -- because (and here Sotomayor is correct) the states were being obligated to take on burdens that "crossed state lines" and a complete remedy to relieve them of these burdens actually requires a universal injunction. So, imv, under the history of what equitable remedies are supposed to do, this would be one rare case where the action of the courts could be legally defensible.
> However, the SC was extremely fed up with district courts sending inumerable number of cases their way -- trigger happy judges at the distict level deciding they're going to rule for the whole US in a federal system. So, by this point, they've tried many times to stop it, and it hadnt worked.
...so you were lauding a "Some of you may die, but it's a sacrifice I am willing to make" opinion?
We're talking citizenship here, in a time when the executive branch is deporting people as hastily as possible to prevent judicial review. But the supreme court was "extremely fed up" and took a stand...against universal injunctions. How "non-hysterical" of them.
This judgement has nothing to do with citizenship, and there's yet no reason to suppose citizenship is under threat from the EO as a result of this judgment.
Many states will have state-wide injunctions, and there will be a nation-wide class action suit to go thru the courts, and if there's any executive policy on this, it will receive judicial review.
The SC will also, whilst this is going on, intervene an basically issue a universal injunction as soon as the executive takes any issue whatsoever with this process.
> This judgement has nothing to do with citizenship, and there's yet no reason to suppose citizenship is under threat from the EO as a result of this judgment.
The executive order literally orders agencies not to recognize citizenship for children born in the US after February 19th to parents that aren't citizens or permanent residents. That can now proceed if you weren't personally covered by the three existing injunctions, so not sure what you're talking about.
It cannot proceed for 30 days, in which time they can file a class action case -- and states which want to challenge this can still obtain state-wide injunctions. Neither has happened only because of the UI, not because the UI itself is required to challenge this.
And when this has a policy implementation it can be reviewed by the courts under the APA and that policy declated unconstitutional.
So no, this ruling says nothing about the executive order. An K's concurrence explains all the ways the order can still be challenged.
Ironically, imv, I think in this case, they didnt. This was, imv, a case where a universal injunctions was actually within the power of the disctict court -- because (and here Sotomayor is correct) the states were being obligated to take on burdens that "crossed state lines" and a complete remedy to relieve them of these burdens actually requires a universal injunction. So, imv, under the history of what equitable remedies are supposed to do, this would be one rare case where the action of the courts could be legally defensible.
However, the SC was extremely fed up with district courts sending inumerable number of cases their way -- trigger happy judges at the distict level deciding they're going to rule for the whole US in a federal system. So, by this point, they've tried many times to stop it, and it hadnt worked.
Here all they said is that you can have UIs only where congress makes explicit that courts have this power. They have done something kinda similar in the APA (creating judicial review of exec action), and can do again here (eg., a democratic congress could give the power in immigration cases; I think its plausible something like this happens). They also themselves retain the right to make such orders.
So they have only really moved where in the system such action is taken, retaining district court's rights to still -- very broadly -- give quite wide injunctions. And congress still has the power to empower the courts (though, as per usual, Thomas indicates he's on crazy pills and implies he would prevent congress from doing that -- that's not a serious outcome though).
Given the problems they faced with district courts, something had to give. They were persuaded, plausibly correctly, that there are enough avenues to prevent this executive overreach without empowering the lowest rung of judges to rule for the whole of the US.