So-called "side stories" about throttles that provide feedback are entirely relevant because they address the issue at hand: the supposed benefits of physical feedback in the controls. The Sriwijaya crash is additionally relevant as it happened during a phase of flight where someone's hands were likely to be on the throttle quadrant in the first place.
If you're going to double down on the idea that somehow feedback in a control column is a wildly different affair than feedback in the throttle quadrant, Air France recently had a go around where the two pilots provided opposing inputs without realizing it. The inputs were forceful enough to un-synchronize the controls, so yeah, physical feedback is less helpful than one's intuition suggests.
With Air France 447, there should've been an annunciator that conflicting input was being provided (as well as the ability to lock out one set of controls).
However, when you're task saturated it doesn't matter what you're flying — there are plenty of things you're going to miss. Were there strong benefits to feedback (or lack thereof) on FBW controls there would be some sort of mandate from the FAA or EASA one way or another.
If you're going to double down on the idea that somehow feedback in a control column is a wildly different affair than feedback in the throttle quadrant, Air France recently had a go around where the two pilots provided opposing inputs without realizing it. The inputs were forceful enough to un-synchronize the controls, so yeah, physical feedback is less helpful than one's intuition suggests.
With Air France 447, there should've been an annunciator that conflicting input was being provided (as well as the ability to lock out one set of controls).
However, when you're task saturated it doesn't matter what you're flying — there are plenty of things you're going to miss. Were there strong benefits to feedback (or lack thereof) on FBW controls there would be some sort of mandate from the FAA or EASA one way or another.