When it comes to metadata, an implementation not being widely implemented (yet) is not that big a problem. Select tools will do for meta, so this is an advancement for PNG.
>This is all built on an assumption that arts/media can all be strictly ranked “best” to “worst.”
Not at all. The only assumption the OP needs is that old media can still appeal to modern people, at which point quantity and accessibility may give it a certain advantage.
Iran imports radiopharmaceuticals from Canada and that import was never restricted. Besides, radiopharmaceuticals are done with cyclotrons and do not require 60% HEU.
There are dozens of elements and isotopes used in radiopharmacology. Highly enriched uranium is absolutely one of them -hence why energy.gov is posting about it- and it's significantly cheaper than using a particle accelerator to create radioactive isotopes.
The first infliction point would be to see whether the regime intends to strike at US forces or do they intend to climb down. IMHO, that would be suicidal, but it doesn't mean they won't do it.
The second point is when they decide to end the war (they aren't doing well), and all the accusations start flying. Then there'll be political fallout.
The deal was on only for about 3 years. Iran has been enriching to some extent since 2009. I'd would think there was a lot more in setting it back than a failed deal.
Iran did not have the tech to get beyond 20% at the time. The deal gave them time and funds for that, which is hardly nonproliferation work.
>Clearly that was all for nothing, so no country will ever agree to a similar deal ever again.
Well, yeah, bombing Libya was a huge error, so you end up between a bad deal and bombings. But that's inconvenient politically so nobody mentions who was President then.
Except for the part that it reduced proliferation, reduced stockpiles, and dramatically increased breakout time...? You think a workable solution is to just keep a country perpetually impoverished so it never even has the money required to learn how to enrich?
You don't understand the logic of nuclear weapons, do you?
As Ali Bhutto said: "We will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get our own [nuclear weapon].... We have no other choice!”
> Well, yeah, bombing Libya was a huge error, so you end up between a bad deal and bombings
>Except for the part that it reduced proliferation, reduced stockpiles, and dramatically increased breakout time
The breakout time was _reduced_ in the long run, since Iran was allowed to keep stocks and enrich (limits were to be removed starting from 2026 up to 2031).
>You think a workable solution is to just keep a country perpetually impoverished so it never even has the money required to learn how to enrich
They could just give up.
>You don't understand the logic of nuclear weapons, do you?
I do. They want it for offensive purposes, so it's best to handle it when it's easy. It would have been easier to handle AlQaeda without the risk of Pakistani nukes falling to it.
>Say more. What's the relevance?
Literally read the other talking points on the thread on how signing disarmament deals are cuz see how Qadaffi ended up. US did not have to make that choice.
Breakout time was not reduced lol. You have a deal, then you get another deal, then you get another deal.
"I just got a 1 year discount with a vendor"
The wise man lowered his head and muttered: "No, you have earned a price increase in 12 months."
> They could just give up.
Which makes literally no sense, as we are seeing. The only sensible move for any country is to develop a nuclear weapon as quickly and secretly as possible.
>The only sensible move for any country is to develop a nuclear weapon as quickly and secretly as possible.
That's in contradiction, no? Except there never was any plan or idea on how to get another deal. Iran would have been in a position where no deal was possible, and all the same arguments against what happened now would actually apply against a x100 stronger Iran.
I get the feeling you're willfully playing dumb, but to take it step by step:
Now, after having proven that deals mean nothing both in Ukraine and Iran, the only sensible move is to develop nuclear weapons.
Prior to us having broken both of these deals, there was a believable argument for the US being an honest broker who can ensure security in lieu of you having your own nuclear weapons.
> Except there never was any plan or idea on how to get another deal
What do you mean? You do the same thing again: economic normalization for non-proliferation.
Ukraine started in 2014. Libya in 2011. The truth of the world was already clear at that point, as well as Iranian intentions. The JCPOA was never going to handle a Iranian nuke but would have facilitated it. You cannot use economic incentives to fix a broken world, and Iran had many other motives for nukes.
Iran did not expect to be bombed back at all, which is why their defenses were so shoddy around nearly everything. The _only_ thing having this level of protection is the enrichment facility.
Just about every intelligence agency and expert agrees on nearly all the data. The debate and the 'conflicting' reports are mainly a matter of definitions.
The data is that Iran has some weapons research, and have/had about 400kg of 60% enriched Uranium (no civilian use), an higher amount of lower grade enriched Uranium, and a certain number of centrifuges for enrichment.
The interpretation bit is regarding what's called 'weaponization' (aka taking all the materials and converting them to a bomg):
A modern bomb would use >90% (preferably >95%) Uranium and an implosion mechanism and be light and small enough to put on a common ballistic missile. While getting to 90% would have been easy for them (at one time they 'accidentally' enriched to 88%), they haven't done it yet, and it isn't entirely clear how close they are on miniaturization.
A hacky bomb could use a lower grade of Uranium (60% would barely do if they pooled all of it), be much heavier (it comes with the lower grade), possibly use a simpler gun-type mechanism, and would have to be delivered with some custom mechanism.
So 'weapons grade' could mean '90% and above', or it could mean 'enriched to a level that has no use apart from building weapons'. 'Distance to a bomb' could mean 'distance from what can be easily delivered' or 'distance from any fissile explosive'.
The limits were to sunset starting from 2026 and end by 2031. The deal was to end with Iran being allowed to enrich as much as they wanted to, just a step away from a bomb.
The point was to build trust that Iran would not continue to pursue nuclear weapons. The trust would be built through the multi-year partnership.
The position you're taking only really works if you start from "Iran will always work towards having a nuclear bomb, no matter what." And yeah, if that's your starting place, you've figured out where that path ends up. You're never going to be satisfied with anything Iran says because your fundamental premise is that they can't be trusted to not pursue a nuclear bomb.
By walking away from the deal, we gave Iran a clear message: "you might as well pursue a bomb because we are always going to act like you are, no matter what you actually do."
>The position you're taking only really works if you start from "Iran will always work towards having a nuclear bomb, no matter what."
No, it's a position that assumes some people there have an interest in a nuclear bomb, and some suspicion is warranted - which means a safe deal needed to have them some distance away from a bomb.
After all, if they just wanted nuclear power, they could have trivially had it without all this fuss. It was always so much cheaper to buy LEU than endure all these sanctions.
> The position you're taking only really works if you start from "Iran will always work towards having a nuclear bomb, no matter what."
Understanding that Iran is religiously opposed to the creation of nuclear weapons with only the caveat that the fatwa declaring the development, acquisition, and use of nuclear weapons against Islamic law may be rescinded in the event of an existential threat to the republic, it naturally follows that people hold that belief because they intend to present an existential threat to Iran.
There's no evidence the fatwa even exists (aside from statements by self-interested parties), much less any details of its contents and any exception it may have. At any point they could point to an exception in subsection 4) c) and do whatever they want. Because the fatwa isn't published, they can add whatever exception they want later. If it really exists and is really meaningful, they would have publicized it in advance and so been bound by it.
I believe the right to "do whatever they want" is one generally valued by sovereign entities. The ability to "do whatever they want" is probably not really a good reason to bomb them. It does sound like a good reason to not capriciously discard the JCPOA, which is an agreement they adhered to restricting their enrichment of uranium that was discarded to no positive end by Donald Trump, the man who is illegally starting another US war of choice as we speak.
Would we have bombed them if they'd secretly been violating the JCPOA and developed nuclear weapons in 2017? It's worked for literally everyone else who's tried it and it is hard to empathize with a perspective in which the United States has true moral authority over a country that we destabilized and have continuously demonized.
Then it is very obviously a moral imperative for the leadership of Iran to have the ability to rapidly develop a nuclear weapon in order to protect its sovereignty, a concept you deny Iran, and its many people.
Enrichment to levels suitable for domestic nuclear power (the goal, and follow on decoupling from Russia as the supplier and extractor of fuel for existing Iran nuclear power station) is a magnitude and more less time and effort than enrichment to levels suitable for weapons.
Isotope separation by centrifuge as a physical process follows the laws of diminishing returns, getting rid of all the uranium variations save the rare target weight takes more and more time as percent purity increases.
"Just a step away" was more a hard bridge to cross back when third party inspectors were at the enrichment centres and leaving locked and logged "long soak" spectrometer instruments behind. It's hard to enrich to greater levels without leaving a ratio fingerprint behind in the gamma spectrum.
"The revelation that Iran had built major nuclear facilities in secret, without required disclosure to the IAEA, ignited an international crisis and raised questions about the program's true aim."
That's a tad Descartes before the hordes .. the response that situation in 2002 was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of 2015 which had plenty of carrots, sticks, and ability to peer into dark places .. but not real support from Isreal or the US who scuppered the plan under Trump.
You are aware the deal was entirely dependent on Russia, and the follow-on Biden wanted to sign (but couldn't since Iran wouldn't fully cooperate with IAEA) involved Russia even more heavily? There's no other place that both sides accept can store the enriched Uranium or supply fuel rods to Iran.
>Isotope separation by centrifuge as a physical process follows the laws of diminishing returns
It's the other way around. Going from 3 to 20 percent is much harder than 20 to 60 which is harder than 60 to 90. Going to 99.9999% would be tough, but is unnecessary even for nukes.
>"Just a step away" was more a hard bridge to cross back when third party inspectors were at the enrichment centres
They were allowed to enrich to that level under the deal starting in 2031, inspections would have tested if the enriched material was diverted.
Even if they could be effective at such short notice, it would have taken the US being distracted by some other crisis and being unable to act in the short period between detection and weaponization to lead to a nuke.
You seem to have a mindset that prevents you from perceiving reality.
Israel is a country where all of its people live peacefully with each other according to the same rules, including the 20% of its population is Arab. The problem Israel has is not between its citizens, which is the most diverse group of people in the entire middle east. Arabs and Jews can live peacefully together, they currently do so in Israel, and while Jews are the majority, they do not rule the Arab minority with violence or terrorism or by imposing on them a different set of rules or laws.
The Arabs in Gaza, which is not Israel, on the other hand, live in abysmal conditions, one that I would not wish upon anyone. Unfortunately, they have been indoctrinated from birth to hate Jews by their leaders, and leaders of other countries. They hate Jews more than they love themselves. They have clearly stated on many occasions that their intention is to destroy Israel and kill its Jews. For half of the past 80 years, Arabs in Gaza have had their freedom - from 1947 to 1967 and from 2005 to 2025. Both times they chose to use that time not to better themselves, but to arm themselves to fight Israel.
This is not about being Jewish or Arab, it is about the sane and the insane.
Being an Open-Source, free OS was the Linux selling point, over commercial Unixes and Windows. That was the open lane with relatively little competition. Now that Linux and BSDs are there, it's no longer an empty lane but a tough one to compete in.
Granted FreeBSD could have picked up more instead, but it was almost as young and not to be due to a series of 90s decisions (BSD court case; Linux name being catchy; Linux running a bit better on 386 PCs?; GNU tools being the default?; IBM deciding to invest in Linux).
