Please stop posting these throwaway, sneering replies, no matter how bad the comment you're replying to. Just downvote it, and if you must comment, do so substantively.
Notify me when you launch the first private space company who can go on mars, or the first car company in the US in 100 years. Or build a top AI cluster in less than a month.
The guy was filming ice, they started pushing some other person so he got in between them. They threw him to the ground, where three men pinned his hands down. Another pulled out his pepper spray can, then started beating the victim in the face repeatedly.
At the same time, a fifth agent pats him down. He finds a gun (legally purchased and the MN police have said he was permitted to carry). They remove the firearm and walk away.
Then one of the officers yells "he has a gun" and shoots him point blank. Then another officer fires, which looks to kill him and he drops face-down and the officers back away. Finally, one more pulls out his firearm and puts 9 into the back of the victim's corpse - guaranteeing he can't be saved
Please note, a question does not imply an opinion.
Could you provide a reference for them not being federal law enforcement officers (specifically immigration law)?
I've seen this mentioned several times, but can only find evidence that they are. For example Cornel Law [1]:
> The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is a federal law enforcement agency under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
> CE’s primary mission is to promote homeland security and public safety through criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration.
Even PBS is reporting them as such [2]:
> Federal law gives immigration agents the authority to arrest and detain people believed to have violated immigration law.
> "All law enforcement officers, including ICE, are bound by the Constitution," said Alexandra Lopez, managing partner of a Chicago-based law firm specializing in immigration cases.
And USC 1357 seems to make this indisputable [3], but IANAL.
All the sources I could find that say they aren't law enforcement are questionable, and aren't related to interpreting law.
(1) “Federal law enforcement officer” means any officer, agent, or employee of the United States authorized by law or by a Government agency to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of any violation of Federal criminal law;
HSI special agents have authority to investigate violations across multiple federal statutes including immigration law (Title 8), customs law (Title 19), general federal crimes (Title 18), and the Controlled Substances Act (Title 21). But who we think of as ICE aren't HSI special agents.
Enforcement and Removal Operations (normal ICE agents) do not have this authority and are not Law Enforcement under 18 because they are enforcing administrative removal or civil immigration status violations which are civil proceedings, not Federal Criminal Law violations. Someone whose role is limited to civil or administrative enforcement of immigration status (without authority to enforce federal criminal law) would not, on the face of the statutory language alone, qualify under § 115(c)(1).
Separately, when you fly at an airport, TSA are enforcing a subsection of travel laws (just like ICE enforces a subsection of immigration and customs law), but they are not 'law enforcement' as shown here:
Actual law enforcement is a seperate arm, the Federal Air Marshal Service. You can carry out targeted subsections of the law without being actual law enforcement.
ICE training has been reduced from 5 months to eight weeks. Law enforcement training was 16 weeks on it's own previously. There is zero possibility they are receiving law enforcement training in 8 weeks. There are now rumors training has been reduced to six weeks (ICE fails to update what their current training program is). I would note that training does not mean they are law enforcement (many Prosecutors and others attend Law Enforcement training) that type of training just means that they understand the system. You would not be able to cut ACTUAL law enforcement training in half (or more in this case) if someone is an ACTUAL law enforcement officer. Complete Law Enforcement training would be a REQUIREMENT of an ACTUAL Law Enforcement job, not something optional that can just be cut out.
In addition, 8 CFR § 287.8 - Standards for enforcement activities requires " The following immigration officers who have successfully completed basic immigration law enforcement training are hereby authorized and designated to exercise the power conferred". It can be argued current ICE training does not meet this requirement of Federal law to qualify and they are only authorized for not law enforcement civil immigration enforcement.
Could you provide a reference for them not being federal law enforcement officers (specifically immigration law)? Note that you provided none, but I do find some of your text on an AI generated website.
18 is for "general federal law". Are you trying to say they're not federal law enforcement because it's specific federal law and not general? Do you have a reference that supports this?
From the Cornell link:
> Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), which enforces U.S. immigration law at, within, and beyond U.S. borders;
Are you saying the immigration/deportation enforcement (enforcement) is not federal? It seems it can only be enforced at the federal level [1].
Is this semantics? They're federal agents (this isn't up for interpretation, as case law exists). They enforce federal law [1]. What am I missing? You write as if there's an accepted legal definition. Please provide the reference! Help!
I don't know if it's intentional, but your formatting makes it very unclear where law ends and opinion begins.
Yes, immigration/deportation officers are enforcing civil violations, not criminal, meaning they don't qualify. HSI is the group that does actual criminal stuff and that qualify under statute. ICE officers aren't doing that. Also the statutes that give authority require proper training, which ICE is definitely not receiving with their cut down.
It wasn't a dig. I found the the verbatim text when I searched for some of your on an AI website, trying try to find a reference, since you didn't provide any. Your entire response was very confusing, being a mix of unreferenced pasted text from multiple sources, none that come to the conclusion that you made, which appears to be personal opinion, and, again, no delineation between text of law, pasted text from websites, and your opinion.
I don't see how they come to the conclusion that you do with those links, several seem to be tangential to if they are federal law enforcement. If you could quote exactly what makes you think what you do, that would be helpful, but I'm more interested in legal opinion with some level of qualification behind it, rather than personal opinion, since personal opinion is all I've been able to find.
For the basic training requirement, I guess you're referring to this [1], which is referenced from the others. Do you have a reference that they're not receiving this training? The closest I can find is this investigative journalist [2], with the conclusion seeming to be that they are, at least for the requirements of the law.
If they're not federal law enforcement, I would think finding a reference would be easy saying that they're not, but, again, I've never found one and nobody that claims they aren't has been able to provide one. Again, it is easy to find a reference that they are federal law enforcement.
> I looked but don't have that site in my history.
The one website in my last comment was a reference for immigration law requiring federal enforcement. There's no reason it would be in your history, unless you thought it was for the AI website I found the text on, which means we're at the limits of communication here.
Seems like the "I" and "C" might be more relevant? For hundreds of years of civil jurisprudence, enforcing immigration and customs has not involved shooting non-smuggling citizens in the back. Or face.
We all know what's happening here. And sincere application of relevant visa and trade laws is not it.
ICE are brown shirts. Their job is to terrorize the Designated Enemies of the State.
They would need some kind of training to be an officer. Like almost all police in America they're state sanctioned armed thugs, though ice have even less training and are more racist.
That is a WSJ opinion piece, it is not a meaningful comparison of US lobbying spend separated by party. Political lobbying is an American problem and most assuredly not limited to democrats.
When that talks about "lawless behaviour", it shows citizens standing on public sidewalks speaking freely (not illegal), when it asserts that citizens of MN are "funded by shadowy networks" it offers no proof to that assertion, etc.
It is separate from law enforcement with different rules, training, and authority. They enforcement a subset of rules/law. They are not law enforcement in the general sense law enforcement is thought of, no more than Parking Enforcement. For example they can't pull someone over for breaking the law. They don't have authority to enforce all laws, only immigration and customs, and they have much more limited authority to carrying out their duties than REAL law enforcement.
They are immigrations and customs enforcement, not law enforcement. Their minimal training period and requirements indicates as such. The delegated authority of what they are allowed to do indicates as much. But keep building them up to be something more to justify murder of Americans on the streets.
Welcome to the free marketplace of ideas, dude. Talk about the issue I'm talking about instead of ranting on some vague generalization about how "believing your own eyes" is bad sometimes, thus is always bad???
If someone were talking disprovable nonsense about fairies, it would be totally fair to bring up counter-evidence. This comment of yours is substanceless.
For a long time, if you used full disk encryption, the encryption key never left your machine. If you forgot your password, the data was gone - tough luck, should have made a backup. That's still how it works on Linux.
Pretty surprising they'd back up the disk encryption secrets to the cloud at all, IMHO, let alone that they'd back it up in plaintext.
That's why full disk encryption was always a no-go for approximately all computer users, and recommending it to someone not highly versed in technology was borderline malicious.
"Tough luck, should have made a backup" is higher responsibility than securing anything in meatspace, including your passport or government ID. In the real world, there is always a recovery path. Security aficionados pushing non-recoverable traps on people are plain disconnected from reality.
Microsoft has the right approach here with Bitlocker defaults. It's not merely about UX - it's about not setting up traps and footguns that could easily cause harm to people.
Google Authenticator used to be disconnected from reality like this. Users were asking how to copy the codes to another phone, and they said "you can't, WAI, should add the other phone as a second auth method on every site." Like how people say you shouldn't copy SSH privkeys. I figured out an undocumented way to do it on iPhone by taking an encrypted iTunes backup though.
Eventually they yielded on this, but their later updates had other usability traps. Because Google Auth was the household name for TOTP apps, this maybe ruined TOTP's reputation early-on.
Well they also had the whole backup vs no backup debate. Eventually they added backup to Google account, but it was confusing at times whether or not you actually had a backup.
Except nobody wants to allow users to make backups themselves.
Or maybe I missed something, and there is actually a way to download your phone backup from Google, or PC backup from Microsoft, as actual files you can browse, without having to have a sacrificial device to wipe and restore from backup?
> should add the other phone as a second auth method on every site.
That's the problem right there. Migrating my phone recently (without having broken/bricked the previous one, which is somehow even worse wrt. transferring 2FA these days than getting new phone after old one breaks!), I discovered that most sites I used did not allow more than one authenticator app. If I try to add new phone as second-factor auth method, the website deletes the entry for the old phone.
> Security aficionados pushing non-recoverable traps on people are plain disconnected from reality.
To be fair, if you inadvertently get locked out of your Google account "tough luck, should have used a different provider" and Gmail is a household name so ...
Less snarky, I think that there's absolutely nothing wrong with key escrow (either as a recovery avenue or otherwise) so long as it's opt in and the tradeoffs are made abundantly clear up front. Unfortunately that doesn't seem to be the route MS went.
Google will lock you out of an account even if you remember your password. This happened to me, when Google decided to use the recovery email address for 2FA, locking me out of my primary account. And the exact same change was made to my recovery account, at the same time. As for the recovery email of my recovery emails address, it was with a company that hadn't existed for over a decade, and no longer existed.
As long as the automated flow works everything is great. But if the music stops can you get in touch with a human to fix it? That applies not just to auth but pretty much all of their stuff. Plenty of horror stories have made it to the HN front page over the years.
I've had to get in touch with a human before for account recovery, it worked. Horror stories, idk. I hear horror stories about every single business I interact with, but then don't experience it myself.
I had hoped the average person would have a baseline understanding of how computers work by now. Baseline includes things like the difference between a web browser and a search engine, "the cloud" is someone else's computer, and encrypted means gone if you lose the password/key.
I am sad that this now appears unlikely. I suspect it may even be lower for people in their 20s today than a decade ago.
> Baseline includes things like the difference between a web browser and a search engine, "the cloud" is someone else's computer, and encrypted means gone if you lose the password/key.
One of these things is not like the other...
That's why I'm stressing the comparison to e.g. government documents: nothing in meatspace requires regular people to show anywhere near as much conscientiousness as handling encryption keys.
Or: many people probably know, in the abstract, that "encrypted means gone if you lose the key", much like many people know slipping up while working on a HV line will kill you. Doesn't mean we should require everyone to play with them.
> That's why full disk encryption was always a no-go for approximately all computer users, and recommending it to someone not highly versed in technology was borderline malicious.
Do you feel equally strongly about people using drives that can fail? Is selling a computer without redundant drives also borderline malicious?
> In the real world, there is always a recovery path.
To accounts there is. But data gets lost all the time.
> Do you feel equally strongly about people using drives that can fail? Is selling a computer without redundant drives also borderline malicious?
No. Drives wear out and fail, like all hardware. Much like the compressor in your fridge, or V-belt in your car, you can extend the service life of your drive through proper care, and replace it when it fails to keep the system running. And in practice, hard drives are reliable enough that, with typical usage patterns, most people don't need RAID).
And, much like with fridges and cars, computers and their parts are subject to both market forces and (in more civilized places) consumer protection laws, which ensure computer hardware meets the usual, reasonable expectations of the common person.
> To accounts there is. But data gets lost all the time.
Data loss still happens, which kind of proves my point - computers are hard, and normal people can't even be expected to back things up properly. That's why every commercial PC and mobile OS vendor these days is pushing automated off-site backups using their cloud offerings. Might not be ideal, and even might be a tad anti-competitive, but it's a good deal for 99% of the users.
But this brings me back to my other pet peeve: 2FA, via authenticator apps, passkeys, and other such things that tie your credentials to a device via magic crypto keys. These crypto keys are data, and given how tech companies get away with having no actual customer support, 2FA ends up turning data loss into account access loss.
Mandatory 2FA is a trap, a time ticking bomb, because it's way too easy to make a mistake and lose the keys - and if the backend follows the current High Security Standards, this is irreversible even from the vendor side.
Compare that to expectations people have about the real world - if you lose all your keys to your home or your car, you... just go to a locksmith and show some plausible proof of ownership, and they'll legally break in and replace the locks for you. If you can't produce a plausible proof of ownership, you involve police in the process. And so on. There's always a recovery path.
> And in practice, hard drives are reliable enough that, with typical usage patterns, most people don't need RAID
And most people aren't going to forget a password they put in almost every day that never changes. I don't see why that kind of full disk encryption is so bad.
Well, for a consumer notebook or mobile device, the threat model typically envisions a thief grabbing it from a coffeehouse or hotel room. So your key needs to be safeguarded from the opportunist who possesses your hardware illegally.
Linux can be fairly well-secured against state-level threat actors, but honestly, if your adversary is your own nation-state, then no amount of security is going to protect you!
For Microsoft and the other consumer-OS vendors, it is typically a bad user-experience for any user, particularly a paying subscriber, to lose access to their account and their cloud apps. There are many ways to try and cajole the naïve user into storing their recovery key somewhere safe, but the best way is to just do it for them.
A recovery key stored in the user's own cloud account is going to be secure from the typical threats that consumers will face. I, for one, am thankful that there is peace of mind both from the on-device encryption, as well as the straightforward disaster recovery methods.
The problem is mass-surveillance and dragnets. Obviously if the state wants to go after you no laws will protect you. As we've seen they can even illegally collect evidence and then do a parallel construction to "launder" the evidence.
But One-drive is essentially a mass-surveillance tool. It's a way to load the contents of every single person's computer into Palentir or similar tools and, say, for instance, "give me a list of everyone who harbors anti-ICE sentiments."
By the way my windows computer nags me incessantly about "setting up backups" with no obvious way to turn off the nags, only a "remind me later" button. I assume at some point the option to not have backups will go away.
I agree that "cloud storage" paradigms are a sea change from the status quo of the old days. My father has a file cabinet at home and keys on his keychain, wherein he stores all his important paperwork. There is no way anyone's getting in there except by entering his home and physically intruding on those drawers. Dad would at least notice the search and seizure, right?
What is just as crazy as cloud storage, is how you "go paperless" with all your service providers. Such as health care, utility bills, banks, etc. They don't print a paper statement and send it to your snail mail box anymore. They produce a PDF and store it in their cloud storage and then you need to go get it when you want/need it.
The typical consumer may never go get their paperwork from the provider's cloud. It is as if they said "Hey this document's in our warehouse! You need to drive across town, prove your identity, and look at it while you're here! ...You may not be permitted to take it with you, either!"
So I've been rather diligent and proactive about going to get my "paperless documents" from the various providers, and storing them in my own cloud storage, because, well, at least it's somewhere I can access it. I care a lot more about paying my medical bills, and accounting for my annual taxes, than someone noticing that I harbor anti-jew sentiment. I mean, I think they already figured that part out.
> But One-drive is essentially a mass-surveillance tool.
There are plenty of people that post clear positions on multiple social networks. I personally doubt that One-drive files will provide much more information for most of the people compared to what's already out there (including mobile phone location, credit card transactions, streaming services logs, etc.).
What I think the danger is for individual abuse. Someone "in power" wants one guy to have issues, they could check his One-drive for something.
Best is to make people aware of how it works and let them figure it out. There are so many options (local only, encrypted cloud storage, etc.) I doubt there is an ideal solution for everything.
Full-disk encryption is the opposite of pointless, my dude! The notebook-thief cannot access my data! That is the entire point!
No, I cannot recover the data from an HDD or SSD that I don't possess. But neither can the thief. The thief cannot access the keys in my cloud. Isn't that the point?
If a thief steals a notebook that isn't encrypted at all, then they can go into the storage, even forensically, and extract all my data! Nobody needs a "key" or credentials to do that! That was the status quo for decades in personal computing--and even enterprise computing. I've had "friends" give me "decommissioned" computers that still had data on their HDD from some corporation. And it would've been readable if I had tried.
The thief may have stolen a valuable piece of kit, but now all she has is hardware. Not my data. Not to mention, if your key was in a cloud backup, isn't most of your important data in the cloud, as well? Hopefully the only thing you lost with your device are the OS system files, and your documents are safely synced??
That's a reductionist view. Apple, at least, based a big portion of their image on privacy and encryption. If a company does that and is then proven otherwise, it does a tremendous damage to the brand and stock value and is something shareholders would absolutely sue the board and CEO for. Things like these happened many times in the past.
Nobody today cares about their encryption, their main sales pich now is convenience and luxury. They still need to comply with law which they do. In US or China. Nothing reductionist about stating a fact.
And I agree with that, too. This whole discussion made me realize they pivoted their PR. They probably had to because everyone wants the AI and there's no AI with privacy, at least not with the current processing power of portable devices.
A Proton model makes this very simple: full cooperation and handover and virtually nothing to be extracted from the data. Size is somewhat of a metadata, ip connection points and maybe date of first use and when data changes occurred...
I'm all for law enforcement, but that job has to be old-school Proof of Work bound and not using blanket data collection and automated speeding ticket mailer.
But I guess it's not done more because the free data can't be analyzed and sold.
There are people who just want to punish academics for the sake of punishing academics. Look at all the people downthread salivating over blacklisting or even criminally charging people who make errors like this with felony fraud. Its the perfect brew of anti AI and anti academia sentiment.
Also, in my field (economics), by far the biggest source of finding old papers invalid (or less valid, most papers state multiple results) is good old fashioned coding bugs. I'd like to see the software engineers on this site say with a straight face that writing bugs should lead to jail time.
And research codebases (in AI and otherwise) are usually of extremely bad quality. It's usually a bunch of extremely poorly-written scripts, with no indication which order to run them in, how inputs and outputs should flow between them, and which specific files the scripts were run on to calculate the statistics presented in the paper.
If there were real consequences, we wouldn't be forced to churn out buggy nonsense by our employers. So we'd be able to take the time to do the right thing. Bug free software is possible, the world just says its not worth it today.
Getting all possible software correct is impossible, clearly. Getting all the software you release is more possible because you can choose not to release the software that it is too hard to prove correct.
Not that the suggestion is practical or likely, but your assertion that it is impossible is incorrect.
If you want to be pedantic I’m pretty sure every single general purpose OS (and thus also the programs running under it) falls into the category of not provably correct so it’s a distinction without a difference in real life.
> Between 2020 and 2025, submissions to NeurIPS increased more than 220% from 9,467 to 21,575. In response, organizers have had to recruit ever greater numbers of reviewers, resulting in issues of oversight, expertise alignment, negligence, and even fraud.
I don’t think the point being made is “errors didn’t happen pre-GPT”, rather the tasks of detecting errors have become increasingly difficult because of the associated effects of GPT.
> rather the tasks of detecting errors have become increasingly difficult because of the associated effects of GPT.
Did the increase to submissions to NeurIPS from 2020 to 2025 happen because ChatGPT came out in November of 2022? Or was AI getting hotter and hotter during this period, thereby naturally increasing submissions to ... an AI conference?
I was an area chair on the NeurIPS program committee in 1997. I just looked and it seems that we had 1280 submissions. At that time, we were ultimately capped by the book size that MIT Press was willing to put out - 150 8-page articles. Back in 1997 we were all pretty sure we were on to something big.
I'm sure people made mistakes on their bibliographies at that time as well!
And did we all really dig up and read Metropolis, Rosenbluth, Rosenbluth, Teller, and Teller (1953)?
I cited Watson and Crick '53 in my PhD thesis and I did go dig it up and read it.
I had to go to the basement of the library, use some sort of weird rotating knob to move a heavy stack of journals over, find some large bound book of the year's journals, and navigate to the paper. When I got the page, it had been cut out by somebody previous and replaced with a photocopied verison.
(I also invested a HUGE amount of my time into my bibliography in every paper I've written as first author, curating a database and writing scripts to format in the various journal formats. This involved multiple independent checks from several sources, repeated several times.
Totally! If you haven't burrowed in the stacks as a grad student, you missed out.
The real challenges there aren't the "biggies" above, though, it's the ones in obscure journals you have to get copies of by inter-library agreements. My PhD was in applied probability and I was always happy if there were enough equations so that I could parse out the French or Russian-language explanation nearby.
> And did we all really dig up and read Metropolis, Rosenbluth, Rosenbluth, Teller, and Teller (1953)?
If you didn't, you are lying. Full stop.
If you cite something, yes, I expect that you, at least, went back and read the original citation.
The whole damn point of a citation is to provide a link for the reader. If you didn't find it worth the minimal amount of time to go read, then why would your reader? And why did you inflict it on them?
I meant this more as a rueful acknowledgment of an academic truism - not all citations are read by those citing. But I have touched a nerve, so let me explain at least part of the nuance I see here.
In mathematics/applied math consider cited papers claimed to establish a certain result, but where that was not quite what was shown. Or, there is in effect no earthly way to verify that it does.
Or even: the community agrees it was shown there, but perhaps has lost intimate contact with the details — I’m thinking about things like Laplace’s CLT (published in French), or the original form of the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem (published in Italian). These citations happen a lot, and we should not pretend otherwise.
Here’s the example that crystallized that for me. “VC dimension” is a much-cited combinatorial concept/lemma. It’s typical for a very hard paper of Saharon Shelah (https://projecteuclid.org/journalArticle/Download?urlId=pjm%...) to be cited, along with an easier paper of Norbert Sauer. There are currently 800 citations of Shelah’s paper.
I read a monograph by noted mathematician David Pollard covering this work. Pollard, no stranger to doing the hard work, wrote (probably in an endnote) that Shelah’s paper was often cited, but he could not verify that it established the result at all. I was charmed by the candor.
This was the first acknowledgement I had seen that something was fishy with all those citations.
By this time, I had probably seen Shelah’s paper cited 50 times. Let’s just say that there is no way all 50 of those citing authors (now grown to 800) were working their way through a dense paper on transfinite cardinals to verify this had anything to do with VC dimension.
Of course, people were wanting to give credit. So their intentions were perhaps generous. But in no meaningful sense had they “read” this paper.
So I guess the short answer to your question is, citations serve more uses than telling readers to literally read the cited work, and by extension, should not always taken to mean that the cited work was indeed read.
I think you are not hardcore enough. I paste entire files or 2 3 files at once and ask to rewrite everything.
Then you rewiew it and in general have to ask to remove some stuff. And then it's (good enough). You have to accept to not nitpick some parts (like random functions being generated) as long as your test suite pass, otherwise of course you will end up rewritin everything
It also depends on your setting, some area (web vs AI vs robotics) can be more suited than other
the irony
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